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[Crim. No. 4648. In Bank. Feb. 15, 1946.J

.THE PEOPLE, .Appellant, v. BART MITCHELL,
.".. Respondent.
[1] Criminal Law-Preliminary Proceedings-Holding to Answer

-Sufficient Cause.-In a preliminary examination it is not
necessary that a defendant tie proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in order to support an order holding him to answer
in the superior court. A "reasonable or probable cause" for
such commitment exists if there is sufficient proof to make
it reasonable to believe that defendant is guilty of the offense
charged. (See Pen. Code, § 995.)
[2] HOmicide-Involuntary Manslaughter.-A person commits an
unlawful act within the meaning of Pen. Code, § 192, if he
violates speed laws designed to prevent injury to the person,
and he is guilty of involuntary manslaughter if death is
caused thereby.
[3] Criminal Law-Preliminary Proceedings-Holding to Answer
-Sufficient Cause.-The committing magistrate was justified
in holding defendant to answer in the superior court on a
[1] See 7 Cal.Jm. 982.
[2J Manslaughter in connection with use of automobile far
unlawful purpose or in violation of law, notes, 16 A.L.B. 914;
59 A.L.B. 695; 99 A.L.B. 756. See, also, 5 Am.Jur. 925.
McX. Dig. References: [1, 3] Criminal Law, § 175; [2] Homi··
cide, § 26; [4, 5] Homicide, § 25a; [6, 7J Criminal Law, § llOG,.
[8J Criminal Law, § 1248 (3).
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[4)

(6)

[6]

[7]
. [8]

charge of involuntary manslaughter where it was reasonable
to conclude from the evidence before such magistrate that
defendant drove his automobile in violation of the speed
laws and in reckless disregard for the safety of others.
"t
Homicide-Involuntan- Homicide-Negligent Homicide.-The
1941 amendment ta'Veh. Code, § 500, that provisions of the
Penal Code defini!fg involuntary manslaughter should not apply
to homicide caused by the driving of allY vehicle, prevented
dual liability under Veh. Code,....~ 500. n'1d P(,D. Code, § 192, for
the same conduct.
"'! •
Id.-Involuntary Homicide-Negligent Homicide.-The 1941
amendment of Vch. Code, § 500, did not repeal Pen. Code,
§§ 192, 193 j it left those sections in force but excepted from
their operation homicide caused by the driving of a vehicle.
When the exception was taken away by a subsequent statute,
these sections were then to be applied without the exception.
Criminal La.w-Appeal-Exceptions-Office and Purpose.-An
exception is a formal protest against a ruling of the court,
and its purpose is to canse the question of law to be made a
matter of record so that it may be reexamined by the court
on motion for new trial or be reviewed by the appellate
court.
lei. - Appeal-Exceptions-Necessity. - In eriminal cases an
exception is obsolete.
ld. - Appeal- Dismissal.-An appeal may not be dismissed
for failure to take an exception where such exception, if
required, Deed Dot be taken from an appealable order, such
as an order dismissing an information.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San
Diego County dismissing an information. Gordon Thompson, Judge. Reversed.
Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, Frank Richards,
Deputy Attorney General, Thomas Whelan, District Attorney, and Eugene R. Dukette, Deputy District Attorney,
for Appellant.
Edgar B. Hervey and Henry F. Walker for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant was charged by information
with involuntary manslaughter alleged to have been com(6] See 8 CaLJur. 511; 3 Am.Jur. 47.
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mitted in violation of subdivision 2 of section 192 of the Penal
Code. The superior court on motion of defendant entered
an order dismissing the information on the ground that the
evidence before the committing magistrate was insufficient to
justify holding the defendant for trial. The People appeal.
The record on appeabdoes 119t include the reporter's transcript of the eviden~ at the preliminary examination. The
reporter's transcript of the $roceedings in the superior court,
however, includes a summary by counsel for defendant of the
evidence taken at the prelimi~ary examination, which counsel for the prosecution agreed 'was a "rair and complete sumo. !
mary of all the evidence before the committing magistrate.
This summary was given by counsel for defendant in pre- j
senting his motion to enable the court to pass on the sufficiency of the evidence at the preliminary examination. Defendant has no cause to complain if his counsel's summary is
used by this court for the same purpose.
On October 30, 1944, at about six o'clock in the evening,
defendant drove his car in a southerly direction on Park
Boulevard and Twelfth Avenue in San Diego. An accident
occurred on Twelfth Avenue near the intersection of Park
Boulevard and Russ Street. The part of Park Boulevard
involved herein runs in a general northerly and southerly
direction across Balboa Park. As it approaches the main
buildings of the United States Naval Hospital from the north
it makes a broad curve to the west, returns into a slight curve
to the east. and joins the north end of Twelfth Avenue at.
Russ Street. Commencing near the hospital the grade of Park
Boulevard descends to the south. A streetcar track runs along
the east side of the boulevard, crosses RUSR Street, and proceeds south on Twelfth Avenue. Both Park Boulevard and
Twelfth Avenue are main thoroughfares and at times carry
considerable vehieular traffic. There is a 25-mile an hour I
speed limit sign on the west side of Park Boulevard about·
180 feet north of the north line of Russ Street.
The evidence as summarized by defendant's counsel shows
that defendant drove bis automobile downgrade on Park:
Boulevard at such a high rate of speed that when he came
upon a streetcar that had stopped south of Russ Street tol
take on and discharge passengers. be could not stop his auw.:l
mobile behind the streetcar. He swerved to the left to avoid;'
hitting passengel'R and collided with the left rear corner of
the streetcar thereby losing control of his automobile. The'
automobile eame to rest against a trolley-line-aupport pol~{
I.
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was broken by the impact. A police officer who arrived
at the scene after the accident gave a description of his findings, quoted by counsel as,foUows: "He says this: 'The rear
of the streetcar at the point contact was made between the
car and the streetcar, wlS approximately eighty-one feet south
of the south line of RUBS. Prior to this point running up to
the end of the streetcar wlls approximately twenty-seven feet
of centrifugal skid'~owing a~ application of the brake..<;
about twenty-seven feet before the collision-'leading from
the point of impact to where the car was setting was approximately fifty-one feet of centrifltgal skid.' In other words,
there was a skid mark fifty-one feet after the contact with
the streetcar and twenty-seven feet before. At the point
where the car was resting, a support pole which supports
the trolley lines for the streetcar, was broken oft at the base.
Also an ornamental light standard which was alongside the
support pole, was badly damaged." Two United States Navy
Waves who were walking west on RuBS Street observed the
accident. One testified concerning the speed of the automobile: "We thought it was going very rapidly, and in my
opinion about seventy." The other testified that it was
travelling "very fast" that when she first saw the automobile "it was going around a eurve," and that "as it
turned to its left coming around the curve • . • it was on
two wheels . . . the right front and the right rear wheels,
and ..• the other wheels were in the air." Harvey Anderson, who WaR riding with defendant, died of injuries
received in the accident.
The question presented at the outset is whether the superior
court was justified in holding that there W88 not sufficient
cause to believe the defendant guilty of the offense charged.
[1] In a preliminary examination it is not necessary that a
defendant be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. "Reasonable or probable cause." required to uphold the comInitment of a defendant (Pen. Code § 995), exists if there is
suflicient proof to make it reasonable to believe that the defendant is guilty of the oftense charged. (Pen. Code, § 872;
People v. Tallman, ante, pP. 209. 212 fIG3 P.2d 857]; People
v. O'Brien, 37 Cal.App.2d 708, 712 [100 P.2d 3671; People
v. Fisk, 32 Cal.App.2d 26. 30 [89 P.2d 142]; People ••
Novell, 54 Cal.App.2d 621, 623 [129 P.2d 453].)
Subdivision 2 of section 192 of the Penal Code u ii read

/)

/

/

/

682

PEOPLE tI. MITCHELL

[27 C.2d

at the time of the alleged offense- defined involuntary manslaughter as "the unlawful killing of a human being, without.
malice ... in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony; or in the commission of a lawful act which
might produce death, In an unlawful manner, or without
due caution and ci.eumspection."
The accident occ~ed after defendant had passed a sign
declaring the speed limit in that district to be 25 miles an
hour. The evidence shows VKithout conflict that his speed
was not only in excess of th~ limit, which is prescribed for
residential or business districts where signs are in place
giving notice thereof. but in excess of the 55-mile an hour
limit, which applies unless a different speed limit is established. (Veh. Code, § 511.) It must therefore be determined
whether there was reasonable cause to believe that defendant
was committing an unlawful act or was committing a lawful
act in an unlawful manner within the meaning of section 192
of the Penal Code. Section 510 of the Vehicle Code, the violation of which is a misdemeanor under section 763 of
the code (I'll. re Johnson, 6 Cal.App.2d 654, 656 [45 P.2d
241]; People v. Banat, 39 Cal.App.2d Supp. 765, 768 [100
P.2d 374]; see Knoz v. Pryor, 10 Ca1.App.2d 76, 78 [51 P.2d
·Section 192 was amended In 1945 to read 88 follows:
"Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being, without
malice. It is of thret> kinds:
"1. Voluntary-upon a sudden quarrel or beat of passion.
"2. Involuntary-in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting
to felony; or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce
death, in an unlawful manner. or without due caution and circumspec- I
tion; provided that this subdivision shall not apply to acts committed
in the driving of a vehicle.
"3. In the driving of a vehicle"(a) In the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony,
with gross negligence; or in the commission of a lawful act which
might produce death, in an unlawful manner, and with gross negligence.
neb) In the commission of an nnlawful act, not amounting to felony,
without gross negligence; or in the commission of a lawful act which
might proilullE' dPllth. in an nnlawful manner. but without grOSll negligence.
"This section mall not be construed as making any bomicide in the
driving of a vehicle punishable which is not a proximate result of
the commi88ion of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony, or of the
commission of II lawful Mt which miJ!;ht !,Todnl'l' ileath in an unlawful
manner."
Since the Legislature bas not. exrreBSly declared that violations of the I
IeCtion 88 it formerly read shal not be prosecuted thereunder, the.:
eeetion as it read at the time of the commission of the offense ill to '
.be applied. (Gov. Code, § 9608; Be1et v. Justices Court, 26 CaL2d 197, :
aoo [159 P.2d 17];
Cal..Tur. 10-Yr. Supp. 546.)
. .,,1
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106]), provides that "No person shall drive a vehicle upon a
highway at a speed greater than is reasonable or prudent
having due regard for the traffic on, and the surface and
widt.h of, the highwa~ and in no event at a speed which endangers the safety of pe~ons or property." A prima facie
case of violation of thi~o;;eC'tion arises if the speed of a vehicle
exceeds t.he limits prescrihe<1 ill sect.ion 511 "unless thp defendant establishes by competent evidence t.hat any said speed
in excess of said limit.s did not .constitute a violation of the
basic rule declared in Section nl0 hereof at the time, place,
and under the condit.ion!;: then existing." nefendant has
shown no circumstances explainin~ why his speed did not
constitute a violation of the basiC' rllle declared in section 510.
In some jurisdictions it has been held that the commission
of a misdemeanor is not an unlawful act within the meaning
of involuntary manslaughter !!tatute.o;; like section 192 of the
Penal Code, if the punishable act is malum prohibitum rather
than malum in se. (See 40 C .•1.S_ 923; 5 Am.Jur. 925.) It is
generally recognized, however, that the violation of speed
regulations is an unlawful act within the meanin~of such
statutes. Thus in State v. 'A/eIt'er. 175 N.C. 761. 766 r94 S.E.
6821. the court referred to the distinction between malum
in se and malum prohibitum, stating: "It is, however. practically agreed, without rega.rd t.o this distinction. t.hat if the
act is a violation of a !rtat.ute intended and designed to prevent
injury to the person. Rnd is in itself dangerous. and death
ensues. that the person violatinl! t.he crratut.e is jroilty of
manslaughter at least. . . _" rOommonwea.7.th v. Ramso1/. 130
Pa.Sup.Ct.. 65 fJ96 A. 5641: sel" 40 C.•}.S. 924: 29 C.J.
1153: 1 Wharton. Criminal Law 12th ed. § 157. note 10.)
[aJ In this state it is settled that a person commits an unlawful act within the meaning- of !tection 192 1f he violates speed
laws designed to prevent injury to the person. and that he
is guilty of involuntary manslaughter 1f death ill caused
thereby. (People v. W~7son, 193 Cal. 512. 516 r226 P. 5);
People v, Oollins. ]95 Cal. 32!'i. 348 f233 P. 97]: People v.
Seiler, 57 Cal.App. 195. 199 f207 P. 3961: People v. Cunningham, 64 CalApp. 12, 20 f220 P. 3121: People v. Kelly,
70 Cal.App. 519. 523 r234 P 1101: People v. V01/ Ecko,rlsberg, 133 Ca1.App. 1. 5 [23 P.2d ~191 : !tee People v, 'Mclnf1Ire.
213 Cal. 50, 55-56 fl P.2d 4431: 16 A.TJ.R. 914: 59 A.hR.
695: 99 A.L.R. 756: 41 C .•l. ] 355. ) rS] From the evidence
before the committing magistrate in the present case it would
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be reasonable to conclud(' that defenoant drove hiR automobile not only in do~atj()n of su~h Inwl'l hut in rerklcss
disregard for the safety of others. The committing magistrate was thererore fu]]y jURtified in holding defendant to
answer in thJt superior court.
[4J Defendant contends that at the time of the accident,
the killing of a pezwn by negligent operation of an automobile was not punisllitble as involuntary manslaughter. In
1941 section 500 of the Vehicle Code waR amended to read
aR fo]]ows: "When the death "of any person enSUeR within
one year as the proximate resillt of injuries caused by the
driving of any vehicle with reckle'ls disregard of. or willful
indifference to, the safety of others. the person so operating
such vehicle shall be guilty of negligent homicide, a felony.
and upon conviction thereof l'Ihal1 be puniRhable by imprisonment in the county jail for not more t.han one year or in the
State prison for not more than three years. Hereafter. t.he
proviRions of the Penal Code, defining involuntary manslaughter. shall not apply to homicide ('aused by the driving
of any vehicle." (Stats. 1941. 1414.) Tb(' l'Ientence 1aRt
quoted prevented dual liability under section 500 of the
Vehicle Code and !let'tion 192 of the Penal Code for the same
conduct. (See People v. Amick. 20 Ca1.2d 247 [125 P.2d 25].)
[5J In 1943 the Legislature adopted an "act to amend Seetion 193 of the Penal Code and to repeal Section 500 of the
Vehicle Code, relatin!! to crimes involving t.he operation of
vehiclel'l." (Stats. 1943. p. 1959.) nefendant argue" thRt
the latter act. by repealinlZ section !'iOO of the Vehicle Code.
removed any criminal liability for causing thE' death tlf
another by negligent oneration of a motor vehicle. He eontends that sectionR 192 and 193 of the Penal Code were
repealed b~' the 1941 amendment to section 500 of the Vehicle·
Code in so far aR they applied to homicide caused by the driving of a vehicle, and that it was n~essary t.o provide expressly
for their revival to make them again applicahlE' t.o snch homicide. Defendant relies on the provision in "Iection 9607 of
the Government CodE' that "No crt.atut.e or part of a statute.
{'epealed by another statute. is revived by the repeal of the
repealing !!tatute without expre'l.'I wordl'l reviving such repealed statute OJ' part of a !¢at.ute." ThE' 1941 amendment
to section fiOO of thE' VehiclE' Code. however. did not repeal •
RectionR 192 and 193 of the Penal Code. It left those section!!'
in force but exempted from their operation homicide cal1!~ed,
'by the driving of a vehicle. When the exception was taken
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away, these sections were then to be applied without the
exception. (People v. El'l/, 71 Cal.App.2d 729 [163 P.2d
453).) "The rule of law applicable to this situation is well
stated as follows: 'The ftatutory rule against the revival of a
statute by the repeal of a repealing act relates to absolute
repeals, and not to cases where a statute is left in force and
all that is done in the way of repeal is to except certain cases
from its operation. I~ such cases the statute does not need
to be revived, for it remains in force, and the exception being
taken away, the statute is afterwards to be applied without
the exception; .. .' (25 R.C.L."'934)." (County of Ventura
v. Barry, 202 Cal. 550, 554 r262 P. 1081).) Moreover, the
statute repealing section 500 of the Vehicle Code showed
clearly that the Legislature intended sections 192 and 193
to apply thereafter to homicide caused by the driving of a
vehicle, for it provided that section 193 of the Penal Code be
amended to read: "Manslaughter is punishable by imprisonment in the State Prison for not exceeding 10 years, except
that a violation of subdivision 2 of Section 192 of this code
resulting from the operation of a vehicle is punishable by
imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year
or in the State Prison for not more than five years." The
special limitation upon the punishment of one who commits
involuntary manslaughter in the operation of a vehicle would
be meaningless if the Legislature had not intended to make
such a person punishable for involuntary manslaughter.
Defendant contends that this appeal should be dismissed
because of the failure of the People to take an exception to
the trial court's order granting defendant's motion to dismiss the information. Defendant's theory is that section
1259 of the Penal Code provides that a defendant may
have a ruling reviewed on appeal without taking an exception therefrom, but that no comparable provision gives
such privilege to the People. He concludes, therefore, that
the People cannot review any ruling on appeal unless a
formal exception has been noted in the trial court. This
argument is based upon a misconception of the function
of the exception and the nature of appellate jurisdiction.
[6] The exception is a formal protest against a ruling
of the court, which was of considerable importance when
the record consisted of a bill of exceptions. Its purpose was
to "cause the question of law, which was presented to and
decided by the Court, to be made a matter of record, 80 that
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it may be re-examined by the Court on motion for a new trial,
or be reviewed by the appellate COlllrt." (Smith v. Lawrence,
38 Cal. 24, 27 [99 Am.Dec. 316]; see 3 Am.Jur. 47.) The
widespread usc of the reporter's transcript as the record on
appeal and the modernization of the bill of exceptions into
a narrative statemellt of the proceedings ~ee Rules on Appeal,
rule 7), have re.c;ufted in the practical disappearance of the
formal exception in appellate procedure in this state. [7] The
fact that in criminal cases the record must be a reporter's
transcript, unless it is unobts.inable (rules 33, 36), is further
evidence that the exception in criminal cases is obsolete.
[8] Irrespective of these considerations, however, there
is no force to the contention that an appeal may be dismissed
for failure to take an exception to the order or judgment appealed from. Exceptions, if required, are taken from intermediate rulings in the course of a proceeding to enable the
aggrieved party to have such rulings reviewed on his appeal
The scope of review on appeal is entirely different from jurisdiction of the appeal. When a judgment or order is appealable, as is the order dismissing an information in this case
(Pen. Code, § 1238), appellate jurisdiction attaches upon
the proper and timely filing of a notice of appeal. Thereafter, if a record on appeal is filed, the appellate court must
determine the matter on the merits. If any ruling in the court
below was not the subject of a proper objection by the appellant, the appellate court may deem the error waived and
decide against the appellant on the merits; but it cannot dismiss an appeal because the appellant has, by failure to make
such proper objection, limited the scope of review.
Stated briefly, there is no more purpose in taking an exception to an appealable order than there is in taking an
exception to a final judgment. The exception is only a for-.
mal type of objection, and there is no more formal type of
objection known to the law than a notice of appeal from an'
appealable order or judgment. (Smith v. Lawrence, 38 Cal.
24, 27 [99 Am.Dec. 344]; Denver County Commrs. v. Home.
Savings Bank, 236 U.S. 101, 104 [35 8.Ct. 265, 59 L.Ed.:
485]; United States v. La Fmnca, 282 U.S. 568, 570 [51 S.l;
Ct. 278, 75 L.Ed. 551]; see 3 Am.Jur. 47; 4 C.J.S. 662.);
t4
The order dismissing the information is reversed.

(,tt

Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer,,)
J., and Spence, J., concurred.,~
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